Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 29
Issue 3 September-October

Article 9

Fall 1938

Recent Criminal Cases

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
Recommended Citation
Recent Criminal Cases, 29 Am. Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology 427 (1938-1939)

This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

RECENT CRIMINAL CASES
Edited by the
LEGAL PUBLICATIONS BOARD
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL o

LAW

OLIvER M. TOWNSEND, Case Editor

[Ed. Note. Through the courtesy
of the Daily Legal News of Cleveland, Ohio, we are able to print the
recent opinion of Judge David
Ralph Hertz of the Court of Common Pleas of. Cuyahoga County,
Ohio, in the case of Ohio v. Hubert
Emonds. The case is a graphic
presentation of the question, "When
Should Probation Be Granted?"
Judge Hertz gives his answer in
the opinion printed below.]
This matter is before the Court
after a plea of guilty of manslaughter on an application to suspend the imposition of sentence
and to place the defendant on probation in the manner provided by
law.
Careful search for a discussion
by the courts in this State or elsewhere of when probation is to be
granted or denied has revealed
none. An inquiry, however, into
the theory and rationale of probation is impelled both by the
character of this defendant and the
circumstances of his offense. These
considerations together with widespread misconceptions of what probation is and what it seeks to accomplish, prompt a formal statement by the Court.
The defendant was charged with
having brought about the death of

one James Beebe by stabbing him
early in the morning of June 29,
1937, in a bar room known as
Loyda's Cafe in the city of Cleveland.
The information generally found
in the police reports, in this case is
sketchy and vague. The Court
consequently was compelled to
resort to the provisions of General Code, section 13451-2, to learn
what happened. Accordingly the
witnesses were summoned and examined in open court and in the
manner provided by law.
Of the eighteen persons known
to the police to have been on the
scene, only the defendant and six
others are able to tell us anything
of what preceded the incident.
They are Walter J. Ralph, companion of the defendant, Rudolph
Loyda, proprietor of the cafe, John
Helwig a bartender and Beebe's
three Companions, Edward Higgins, Charles Hesseman and Bernis
Jalovec. Of these all were examined except Jalovec, who failed to
respond to subpoena.
With the exception of the defendant and Ralph all appeared to be
unwilling witnesses. Each had significant lapses of memory. Each
told things favorable to the defendant only after considerable prodding; and for being unwilling to
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say anything reflecting on Beebe.
Nevertheless certain facts stand
out clearly.
For at least three years Emonds
and Ralph had been in the habit
of coming to Loyda's Cafe each
evening after work
(Emonds
worked until about midnight as a
motion picture operator) and there
partaking of a light lunch. Infrequently Emonds would drink
whisky but never more than two
glasses. Emonds and Ralph always seated themselves at a certain table in the cafe with Emonds
in the furthermost corner, his back
to the wall and facing the bar and
Ralph at Emond's left.
Both
Loyda and ?Jelwig corroborate the
statements of Emonds and Ralph
that after having their lunch they
would leave, Emonds invariably
stopping at the bar on the way out
to purchase six or seven cigars.
This had been a nightly habit.
On the night in question Emonds
and Ralph entered and seated
themselves as usual. They had
their lunch, Emonds having a glass
of whisky, several cups of coffee,
and a sandwich. Clearly, he was
not intoxicated.
After a while
they were joined by Loyda, the
proprietor, who sat at the table at
Emond's right. Seated at the bar
were Beebe, his three companions
and others.
Emonds first noticed Beebe when
he observed the four companions
who, though seated in chairs facing the bar, had turned about in
their seats and were staring steadfastly at him. Loyda also observed
the four acting in the same manner. After a while Emonds protested to Beebe. Whereupon Hesseman and Jalovec turned, but
Higgins and Beebe continued to
stare as before.
According to
Loyda this continued for some fif-

teen or twenty minutes. According to Hesseman it was occasioned
by a remark previously made by
Beebe who had asked his friends to
"watch me outstare that fellow."
The staring annoyed Emonds but
Loyda and Ralph both told him to
pay no attention to it. After exchanging words with Beebe, Emonds
told Ralph that he was afraid that
the four were trying to make
trouble and that it would be best
for Ralph and him to leave. He
thereupon rose from the table as
usual and proceeded toward the
bar taking the course he usually
took in purchasing his cigars. Both
Loyda and Ralph thought when he
rose that he was about to follow
his usual procedure although Loyda seems to believe that Emonds
at that time was "riled."
" Unless we believe what Emonds
tells us, we are unable to learn
what followed. Ralph can tell very
little becuse he sat or stood with
his back to the bar. Loyda, probably because he is unwilling to offend neighborhood customers and
is eager to portray his establishment as a peaceable and orderly
place, claims to know equally little.
Beebe's two companions who
testified, also claim to have seen
little and give highly improbable
explanations therefor.
Higgins
testifies that as he saw Emonds approaching he purposely turned
away because he did not want to
see what happened; Hesseman says
merely that he wasn't watching.
The bartender claims to have been
busy serving a customer. All agree
that they saw no knife in Emond's
hands as he approached Beebe and
that whatever happened, took place
quickly and without noisy turmoil.
Emonds relates that as he passed
Beebe the latter, who was still
staring at him, kicked him, strik-
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ing him in the right leg about three
or four inches below the knee.
Emonds continues:
"I said, 'Why don't you mind
your own business? There is
nobody bothering you.' He then
said 'I will sock you one,'-as
much as I could understand of it
at the time. I said 'Oh yeah?'
With that he got off his chair
and struck me in the upper part
of my chest-my right shoulder.
I grabbed the arm with which he
struck me and pushed him away
from me. He came toward me a
second time. First I held him
at arm's length and then retreated a foot or so, when I noticed that Higgins had jumped
up behind me so that Beebe
stood between me and one door
and Higgins between me and the
other door. I heard Higgins say
'You -.
Come outside.' I
had been fishing shortly before
and was still wearing my fishing
jacket in which I usually carry
a fish knife. When I saw Beebe
acting in this way and thought
that Higgins was behind me and
Beebe's other two friends at my
side I was frightened and lost
my head. I pulled out the fishing knife from my pocket because it was the only thing I
had handy and opened it. I had
to use both hands to open it.
Beebe then yelled to Higgins,
'Look out, he's got a knife!' and
advanced toward me. again. I
swung my hand moving it no
more than three or four inches.
Beebe ran into it as much as I
swung it. I was so excited I
wanted to get away. I went to
the rear of the place, Higgins hnd
Beebe following me.
Beebe
stopped short of the door and returned, but Higgins followed me
outside calling me vile and abu-

sive names. I got my car and
drove away. I explain it all by
my desire to avoid trouble. If
Beebe hadn't kicked me I would
have walked past him. It would
not have occurred if Higgins had
not gotten behind me."
The other witnesses, except Ralph
who speaks vaguely of having seen
Emonds holding Beebe's arm, say
they saw nothing of the stabbing.
Higgins denies standing behind
Emonds and the physical arrangement of the seats argues that Higgins is probably more accurate in
this respect than Emonds. All witnesses are in agreement, *however,
that Higgins without knowing that
Beebe had been stabbed, in great
anger pursued Emonds beyond he
door and abused him vilely for
carrying a knife.
Emonds' story because it is the
defendant's own, naturally invites
skepticism. Nevertheless several
considerations singly and taken together argue in its favor. It is
contradicted by neither witness or
circumstances. It is consistent and
harmonious with what he has
claimed from the very beginning.
It is not unreasonable or implausible. Beyond question Beebe had
sought to provoke the quarrel and
it is not difficult to belleve that
one disposed as he was, may have
kicked and struck Emonds. At the
same time Higgins' conduct, his
angry and abusive pursuit of the
defendant, can be understood only
if Higgins had participated in
Beebe's aggressions. Furthermore
Emonds' plea of guilty, at least in
measure, increases our respect for
his credibility, especially since
without it, we should have no direct evidence whatsoever that it
was he who stabbed Beebe. Finally,
his account offers the only explanation afforded by the evidence
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of why Emonds acted as he did,
which is that in a frightened eflort
to save himself from a peril which
he overestimated, he resorted to
unjustifiable methods of escape.
Were there other evidence before
us, we might then choose what to
believe. In the absence of such,
we are in duty bound to moderate
our doubts and to accept the defendant's account at least in cardinal measure.
See Houston v. State, 1"17 Miss.
311, 78 So. 182;
Martin v. State, Miss., 106 So.
270;
State v. Hurst, 99 W. Va. 222,
116 S. E. 248;
Cf. Ickes v. State, 42 Oh. App.
446, 182 N. E. 49.
Emonds was indicted for second
degree murder. He was permitted,
however, with the concurrence of
the prosecuting attorney to plead
guilty to the included charge of
manslaughter.
That the killing
was suddenly precipitated and was
motivated without either malice or
specifically formulated intention to
kill seem clear. The acceptance of
a plea to the crime of manslaughter was amply justified under the
law as it is doubtful if the facts
ever justified an indictment for
murder in the second degree.
Erwin v. State, 29 0. S. 186,
approved in Beard v. United
States, 158 U. S. 550, 39 L. Ed.
1086, 15 Sup. Ct. 962;
Bennett v. State, 10 0. C. C.
84, 4 C. D. 129;
Bailus v. State, 16 0. C. C. 226,
8 C. D. 526;
Turk v. State, 48 0. App. 489,
2 Oh. Ap. 96, 194 N. E. 425; affirmed 129 0. S. 245, 194 N. E.
453.
The plea was entered on December 6, 1937. Sentence, however, was passed pending report
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by the Probation Department and
by Dr. Royal S. Grossman, Director of the Psychiatric Clinic of this
Court. The defendant was ordered
held in the County Jail where he
has been detained ever since that
date.
That the Court may place a defendant on probation after conviction for manslaughter is generally
accepted since 1931, Opinions of
the Attorney General, No. 3336.
In this County alone in 1936, fourteen cases and in 1935, sixteen
cases were referred to the Probation Department following conviction for manslaughter. Cursory
examination of the Department's
records reveals at least six instances
of voluntary manslaughter where
probation was granted with success. During the current term of
court in this County a defendant
who had killed his wife was placed
on probation.
General Code Section 13452-1
reads as follows:
"In prosecutions for crime, except as mentioned in G. C. 621217, and as hereinafter provided,
where the defendant has pleaded,
or been found guilty and it appears to the satisfaction of the
judge or magistrate that the
character of the defendant and
the circumstances of the case are
such that he is not likely again
to engage in an offensive course
of conduct, and the public good
does not demand or require that
he be immediately sentenced,
such judge or magistrate may
suspend the imposition of the
sentence and place the defendant
on probation in the manner provided by law, and upon such
terms and conditions as such
judge or magistrate may determine; provided that juvenile de-
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Chief Justice Bartley continues
linquents shall not be included
within this provision."
in the same opinion at page 174:
By virtue of this provision, the
"The legitimate purpose of
Court is granted discretionary
criminal punishment being the
powers which he may exercise
safety of the community and its
only in constant mindfulness of the
individual members by preventpublic good. How that good may
ing the commission of crime, it is
be served most effectually was
the duty of the government to
pointed out by our Supreme Court
endeavor to reform rather than
speaking through Chief Justice
exterminate offenders. And exThos. W. Bartley as early as 1857
perience has taught, that the obwhen he said:
jects of the criminal law are bet"The leading, if not the sole
ter attained by 'moderate but
object, in the administration of
certain than by severe and excriminal justice, is the safety and
cessive penalties.'
protection of the community and
Despite the tremendous contribuits several members. Criminal
tions made by the social sciences
punishment is not inflicted as an
since the day the foregoing was
atonement or expiation for crime;
written, it is doubtful if a more
that must be left to the wisdom
scientific and statesmanlike formuof an overruling Providence.
lation of .policy could be written
And the experience of the past
today. Modern penology would be
ages has taught that crime is
content to adopt it as its creed.
nore effectually prevented by
The requirements of the public
the certainty than by an unreasonable severity of punishment good as thus defined demand, first
disproportionate to the turpitude that we deny ourselves the luxury
and danger of the offense. Touch- of moral wrath in dealing with ofthis subject, Blackstone in his fenders but comfort ourselves, if
Commentaries, uses the follow- we must, with the recollection that
vengeance belongs to the Lord.
ing language:
'It is absurd and impolitic to Second, that we remember that
apply the same punishment to certainty of punishment may- accrimes of different malignity. complish a deterrent purpose, but
A multitude of sanguinary severity defeats that purpose by
laws (beside the doubt that making conviction more difficult and
may be entertained concerning by making men worse, not better.
the right of making them) do And third, that in the performance
likewise prove a manifest de- of our duty to society, we rememfect, either in the wisdom of ber that because felons must leave
the legislative, or the strength prison as well as enter them, we
of the executive power. It is give society only ephemeral proa kind of quackery in govern- tection unless our correctional
ment, and argues a want of methods leave them better than
solid skill, to apply the same they were when we took them.
universal remedy, the ultimatm The Court must choose in his desupplicium to every case of sire to protect the community, between two courses. He may comdifficulty."'
Robbins v. State, 7 0. S. 131, mit the defendant to the penitentiary or he may suspend sentence
at p. 170, 171. •
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and place the defendant on probation.
The first course has one conceded and two alleged but doubtful virtues. Unquestionably while
the defendant is confined his opportunities for injuring others are
restricted. It is also claimed, however, that imprisonment "teaches
him a lesson," "gives him a chance
to think it over" and "makes a
man of him." Of that there is no
substantiating evidence. Whatever
data we have, prove to the contrary. And similarly as to the
second virtue claimed for imprisonment, that it deters others.
As early ap in Blackstone's days,
the value of severity as a deterrent
was challenged. In speaking of the
one hundred and sixty offenses
then punishable by death under the
laws of England, he said:
"So dreadful a list, instead of
diminishing, increases the numbers of offenders. The injured,
through compassion, will often
forbear to prosecute; juries,
through compassion, will sometimes forget their oaths, and
either acquit the guilty, or mitigate the nature of the offense;
-and judges, through compassion,
will respite one half of the convicts, and recommend them to
the royal mercy. Among so
many chances of escaping, the
needy and *hardened offender
overlooks the multitude that suffer; he boldly engages in some
desperate attempt to relieve his
wants or supply his vices; and if
unexpectedly the hand of justice
overtakbs him, he deems himself
peculiarly unfortunate in falling
at last a sacrifice to those laws
which long impunity has taught
him to contemn."
The facts are so irresistible that
the National Commission on Law
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Observance and Enforcement (the
so-called Wickersham Commission) over the signatures of such
eminent jurists and scholars as
Geo. W. Wickersham, Newton D.
Baker, Roscoe Pound and others,
reported as follows:
We conclude that the
"1.
present prison system is anti-quated and inefficient. It does
not reform the criminal. It fails
to protect society. There is reason to believe that it contributes
to the increase of crime by hardening the prisoner. We are
convinced that a new type of
penal institution must be developed, one that is new in spirit,
in method and in objective."
Vol. III Reports-Nat'l Comm.
on Law Observance and Enforcement, p. 170.
Discussing the other alternative
before the Court, the same Commission over the same signatures
in the same report, at page 173,
says:
"16. Probation must be considered as the most important
step we have taken in the individualization of treatment of the
offender . . .
"18. No man should be sent to
a penal institution until it is
definitely determined that he is
not a fit subject for probation.
To this end it is urged that every
effort be made to broaden probation and provide more and
better probation supervision . . .
It is clear that probation where
it is applicable, is much less expensive and, from the social
point of view, much more satisfactory than imprisonment."
Probation is a form of correctional treatment, in which sense, it
is punishment fully as much as imprisonment. It is not leniency. It
is not a sentimental concession
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which gives "the defendant another
chance." It is not a comfortable
device for escaping the performance of an uncomfortable judicial
duty.
Its defects are two. It is occasionally granted unwisely and
sometimes without the necessary
supervision. Its shortcomings are
those of administration, not of
principle.
Where, however, the cases are
chosen wisely and the supervision
is effective, it offers many advantages. It is economical for its
cost is only a fractiofn of the cost
of imprisonment. It conserves the
earning power of the defendant for
the benefit of his dependents and
saves them from the charity rolls,
and the public from the burden of
supporting them. It permits the
defendant to make restitution to
those he has wronged. Finally in
the effort to rehabilitate the defendant, it utilizes what is good in
his environment and character and
aims either to eliminate or cure
what is bad.
But most significant, is its relative success in protecting society.
While sixty per cent of the former
inmates of our penal institutions,
get into trouble again, about eighty
per cent of those placed on probation serve their terms successfully
and according to the figures available, only four per cent of these
ever get into difficulty later.
Sanford Bates, formerly head of
the U. S. Department of Prisons,
President of the American Prison
Association, and one of the world's
renowned penologists, writing in I,
Laws and Contemporary Problems,
at page 485, summarizes probation:
"as an alternative to letting a
man go free without restraint,
without guidance, and without
hope of reconstruction"
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and not as it is so often emphasized:
"as an avoidance of prison or as
an expression of leniency. Properly administered, probation is a
deterrent, it is a restraint, and
it is a compulsion upon a man
to do what he can to re-establish
himself."
In short, the case for probation
may be summarized in the words
of the late President Calvin Coolidge:
"Justice requires as strongly
the saving of that which is good,
as it does the destruction of that
which is evil. The work that the
probation officers are doing is
saving of that which is good in
the individual, along with the
correction of that which is evil.
Probation is the right hand in
the administration of Justice."
Quoted as Foreword to "Probation and Delinquency" by Edwin J. Cooley, Thos. Nelson &
Sons, N. Y., 1927.
Unless therefore there exists
some specific reason to doubt the
safety and propriety of placing this
defendant on probation, it would
appear that the good of society demands and requires not his incarceration, but having him placed on
probation. We therefore -consider
whether it is safe to release him.
Addressing ourselves first to thecharacter of the defendant, we
learn that he is forty-seven years
old and one of eight sons and
daughters of respected parentage.
Although all his brothers 5nd sisters have reached middle "ge he is
the only member of the family ever
to run afoul of the law. He, however, has had considerable difficulty.
Beginning in Juvenile
Court, his involvements reached a
climax in 1921 when he was sentenced to the Ohio State Peniten-
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tiary for burglary and larceny.
Since his release in 1924 he had
led a lawabiding and abstemious
existence earning his livelihood as
a motion picture projectionist at
a salary of from $72 to $82 per
week. He has held his present job
for the last six years and his employer, as well as previous employers, have manifested unusual
concern for his welfare. His various acquaintances, friends, employers, and without exception, all
who have had occasion to learn
anything about him, speak of him
as quiet, earnest, industrious and
dependable. Not even a slight
question has been raised as to his
conduct for the last seventeen
years.
Generally a record of previous
misconduct raises a presumption
that the offensive conduct will be
repeated in the future and therefore makes probation unjustifiable.
That presumption is not tenable
here. Neither the background of
his youth nor the character of his
earlier offenses is related to the
matter before us. The Emonds of
1921 and prior thereto, and. the
Emonds of 1924 and since, have litile in common and the offenses of
those days are totally dissimilar to
the offense now under consideration. Seventeen years of successful self-adaptation to the requirements of society, moreover, argue
convincingly that his past history
has only collateral significance for
US.
His first wife, to whom he was
married in 1914, died in 1921. He
was married again in 1926 and divorced from his second wife in
1936. Since then he has been paying her for the support of their
eleven year old daughter and herself the sum of $90 per month.
These payments were made regu-
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larly and conscientiously. Careful
investigation of the background of
the divorce, to ascertain whether it
might throw any light upon our
problem, reveals nothing reflecting
upon this defendant and nothing
of any significance here.
Except for an impairment of
hearing, his physical examination
revealed nothing noteworthy, while
the preponderance of the evidence
indicates that his intelligence is
normal.
The psychiatric study,
however, raised considerations
which required careful investigation and thought.
The defendant was examined
clinically and studied not only by
Dr. Grossman of this Court but
also by Dr. S. Baumoel a highly
regarded neurologist and psychiatrist of this city, who was invited
into the case at the instance of the
defendant's -present employer. In
addition the defendant was given
certain of the newer tests which
though offering great promise of
future usefulness, as yet lack validation and complete scientific acceptance.
The Rorschach Test revealed
emotional difficulties in the structure of his personality such as internal conflicts, anxieties and fears.
We are unable, however, to conclude from such findings that his
conduct was unconsciously motivated. We have no assurance that
the test did not reflect merely his
prevailing mood in his present
plight when adjusted individuals
might reasonably succumb to similar emotional disturbances. Furthermore such a conclusion was
negatived by the findings in the
Bell Inventory Adjustment and the
Minnesota Scale for the Survey of
Opinions which showed superior
emotional and social adjustments.
Although the latter tests are based
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merely on verbalized attitudes,
they are consistent with the clinical
findings which not only specifically
eliminate gross pathological factors,
but find him a well-adjusted individual whose history revealed no
vicious or violent temper reactions
or tendencies.
Both psychiatrists conclude that
the defendant is not likely to seek
or to create another experience of
like nature and that he can be
counted upon to try to avoid any
similar situation. Dr. Grossman,
however, believes that if the defendant "were unavoidably forced
into it we might in the future see a
repetition." Such an unavoidable
situation, however, would require
a singular combination of circumstances which by the law of chance
is so unlikely to occur that we may
with safety minimize it. Certainly
possibility must be' distinguished
from likelihood and the likelihood
is too small to justify incarceration merely on that account. On
the other hand, careful supervision
and psychiatric treatment might
even further minimize this risk
which is already minimal.
On the whole we are of the opinion that the character of the defendant, as revealed by his life
history and the psychiatric studies
which have been made, while not
eliminating all possibility of'trouble
in the future, justifies us nevertheless in saying "that he is not
likely again to engage in an offensive course of conduct."
We address ourselves now to the
circumstances of the case. Clearly
this defendant must be distinguished from one who without
provocation and of his own spontaneous conduct engages in a crime
of violence. Had Beebe and his
companions let him alone, Beebe
would still be living and Emonds
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still winning his struggle to make
good. There is nothing in the facts
to indicate that Emonds in this
crime ever intended to defy society or to hold human life cheaply.
On the contrary there is much to
make us believe that his conduct
was motivated largely by fear and
partly by desire to avoid trouble.
There is no reason in the facts as
we have heard them to believe that
Emonds' conduct in this offense
reveals an anti-social attitude or,
habit.
It should be noted that Emonds
has been incarcerated for approximately three and one-half months
in the County Jail. Unavoidably
that incarceration was accompanied by uncertainty which in itself was punishment. During that
period of time he has not known
whether his detention would be
brief or long, whether he would
be placed on probation or sent to
the penitentiary. It would seem
that the incarceration under such
circumstances, accompanied by the
mental torture that uncertainty
must have brought in its trail,
should go far toward accomplishing whatever good may be realized
from incarceration.
Furthermore placing the defendant on probation does not permit
him to escape punishment. To impress both the defendant and others with the seriousness of this
offense and in this sense to accomplish punishment as rigorous
and effective as imprisonment, the
conditions of probation mdy exact
pecuniary restitution and impose
onerous restraints upon liberty.
Finally neither the defendant
nor his crime is such as to shock
the conscience of the community
if he is placed on probation. He
occupies no position of wealth or
influence; he is in humble circum-
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stances, and while-his friends are
loyal, they share his position in
life. His crime affects directly
only a small number of persons
and it is fully as attributable to
unfortunate coincidence as to
choice on his part. Placing him on
probation therefore in no wise endangers the prestige of our lawenforcing institutions.
The Court therefore concludes
that this case is one in which "the
character of the defendant and the
circumstances of the case are such
that he is not likely again to engage in an offensive course of conduct, and the public good does not
demand or require" that Emonds
be sent to the penitentiary. We
therefore, in accordance with usual
practice sentence him to the Ohio
State Penitentiary but suspend
execution of the sentence and
place him upon probation for five
years, the maximum term.
The conditions and terms of such
probation shall, however, be as
follows:
1. That Emonds abide by the
usual rules, regulations and requirements of the Probation Department;
2. That, in accordance with arrangements between the mother
of the deceased James Beebe and
this defendant, the defendant
pay to her the sum of Fifty Dol-

lars per month for five years for
the purpose of contributing toward her upport in lieu of that
support which her son might
have given her.
3. That the defendant continue
as heretofore to comply with the
order of the Court in his divorce
proceedings and pay to his former wife for the support of herself and their daughter, the sum
of Ninety Dollars ($90.00) per
month, in accordance therewith;
4. That the defendant refrain
from visiting in any way any
public place where alcoholic
beverages of any nature or kind
are consumed upon the premises;
5. That the defendant make
himself the patient of a psychiatrist of his own choosing but
subject to the approval of the
Psychiatric Clinic of this Court,
that he abide by the course of
treatment to be prescribed by
such psychiatrist, and submit to
said Psychiatric Clinic quarter
annual reports by his psychiatrist describing his progress
and condition and providing such
information as said Clinic may
require.
In the event of any wilful
breach of these conditions, the
probation shall be terminated and
the sentence to the penitentiary
ordered into execution forthwith.

